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Abstract
A recent proof, couched in the symbolic language of modal logic, shows
that a well-defined formulation of the question posed in the title is an-
swered affirmatively. In a paper with the same title Unruh has tried in
various ways to translate the symbolic proof into normal prose, and has
claimed that the proof must fail in some way or another. A correct trans-
lation is given here, and it is explained why the difficulties encountered
by Unruh do not actually arise.
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One of the great lessons of quantum theory is that utmost caution must
be exercised in reasoning about hypothetical outcomes of unperformed experi-
ments. Yet Bohr [1] did not challenge the argument of Einstein, Podolsky, and
Rosen [2] on the grounds that it was based on the simultaneous consideration
of mutually exclusive possibilities. Rather he challenged the underlying EPR
presumption that an experiment performed locally on one system would occur
“without in any way disturbing ” a faraway system. Bohr’s own ideas rested
heavily on the idea that experimenters could freely choose between alternative
possible measurements, and the core of his answer to EPR was that although “...
there is in a case like that just considered no question of a mechanical influence
of the system under investigation during the last critical stage of the measuring
procedure.”...“there is essentially the question of an influence of the very condi-
tions which define the possible types of predictions about future behavior of the
system.”
The adequacy of Bohr’s answer, and the nature of his intermediate position
on the question of these influences, has been much debated. The issue is of
fundamental importance, because it concerns the nature of the causal structure
of quantum theory, and its compatibility with the idea, drawn from the theory of
relativity, that no influence of any kind can act backward in time in any frame.
To obtain rigorous results in this realm it is useful to formulate arguments
within a formal logic, where each separate statement can be stated precisely,
and the rules of inference connecting them are exactly spelled out. This was
done in reference [3] where a logical contradiction was shown to arise from a
combination of explicitlty stated assumptions. One of these assumptions was a
locality (no-faster-than-light-influence) condition LOC1, which expresses Bohr’s
“no mechanical influence” condition. It states that if an experiment L2 is ac-
tually performed in a spacetime region L, and an experiment R2 is actually
performed in a faraway region R that lies later in time than L (in some frame),
and if an outcome c appears to the observers stationed in the earlier region L,
then that same result c would have appeared to the observers in L in the al-
ternative possible case in which nothing is changed except for the later-in-time
free choice by the experimenter in R and the consequences of this change: LOC1
asserts that the later free choice in R has no effect on the outcome that appeared
earlier to the observers stationed in region L.
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The argument in reference [3], stated here in words, rather than the symbols
of modal logic, starts as follows:
Suppose the actual situation is such that L2 and R2 are performed and
the outcome g appears to the observers in R. Then a prediction of quantum
theory, in the Hardy case under consideration in [3], entails that the outcome
appearing to the observers in L must be c, in this actual situation. But according
to LOC1 this actual outcome c appearing to the observers in L would not be
disturbed if the later free choice in R were to perform R1 instead of R2: the
actual outcome appearing to the observers in L would remain c. But then if the
laws of quantum theory are assumed to hold not only in the single unique world
that is actually created by our free choices but also in the alternative possible
worlds that would be created if our alternative free choices had been different,
then another prediction of quantum theory in this Hardy case entails that the
outcome appearing to the observers in R, in this alternative possible situation
(in which R1 is performed instead of R2) must be f.
This result is summarized in line 5 of my proof, which in prose reads:
LINE 5: If L2 is performed then SR is true,
where SR is the statement:
SR: “If R2 is performed in R and outcome g appears to the observers in R,
then if R1, instead of R2, had been performed in R the outcome f would have
appeared to the observers in R.”
The form of this claim in line 5 is the same as a typical claim in classical
mechanics: if the result of a certain measurement 1 is, say, g, then the determin-
istic laws of physics may allow one to deduce that if some alternative possible
measurement 2 had been performed, instead of 1, then the result of that mea-
surement 2 would necessarily have been f: knowledge of what happens in an
actual experimental situation may, with the help of theory, allow one to infer
what would have happened if one had performed, instead, a different experiment.
Note that the assumptions in line 5 pertaining to region L do not include
the condition that outcome c appears to the observers in L: that condition is im-
plied by the predictions of quantum theory and the explicitly stated conditions,
namely that L2 and R2 are actually performed, and that outcome g appears to
the observers in R.
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This prose description is clear and direct, and it conforms to the meanings
ascribed to the statements in my proof by the rules modal logic. This logic
has been developed by philosophers and logicians for dealing with statements
of the sort occurring here. Of course, that logic was designed to formalize nor-
mal rational thinking, and it may therefore incorporate philosophical prejudices
drawn from the prevailing classical conception of the nature of reality. Still,
Bohr strongly supported the idea that no non-classical-type of logic or reason-
ing is needed to deal with our descriptions at the level of possible experimental
set-ups, and our observations of their outcomes. No other kind of description
enters into my argument.
Unruh [4] has set forth an array of different interpretations of practically
every statement in my proof, and has encountered all sorts of difficulties.
Of the interpretations of LOC1 offered by Unruh, the one closest to the one
occurring in my proof is the one he describes first: “On face value this is just the
unexceptional statement that if L2 is measured to have value c then the truth
of having obtained that value is independent of what is (or will be) measured
at R”. My statement is only slightly different: “This is just the unexceptional
statement that if L2 is measured and the outcome appearing to the observers in
L is c, then this latter fact is independent of which measurement will later be
performed in R: the later free choice by the experimenter in R does not disturb
what was observed earlier by the observers in region L.”
Unruh claims that “this meaning of LOC1 is insufficient to derive his
[Stapp’s] conclusion, since it demands that L2 had actually been measured and
had the given outcome. It ties the meaning of this locality condition to the ac-
tuality of the measurement and its outcome. This does not allow counterfactual
replacement of L2, since the truth of this statement is, under this interpreta-
tion, tied to the truth of the measurement of attribute L2 actually having been
carried out in L, and having obtained that specified outcome.” [I have replaced
by L2 some apparent misprints]
To evaluate this objection we must turn to the second locality condition,
LOC2, and its application, for that is where the condition L2 is relaxed.
LOC2 is connected to line 5, which says that if L2 is performed then state-
ment SR is true.
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Suppose the experiment L2 is performed in a spacetime region that lies
much later in time (in some frame) than all points in the region R in which all
of the possible events referred to by SR lie. And suppose the later choice between
L1 and L2 is really free: i.e., that this choice is independent of everything that
happens earlier.
Then the demand that there be no backward-in-time influence of any kind
requires that SR cannot be necessarily true if the later free choice is L2, but be
untrue if the later free choice is L1: such a difference would constitute some sort
of backward-in-time influence.
LOC2 is, accordingly, the assertion that if SR is true under condition L2,
then it is also true if L1, instead of L2, is performed in L.
Of course, the proof that SR is true under condition L2 depends upon the
fact that L2 is performed, and that proof certainly fails if L2 is not performed.
But LOC2 does not say that the proof of SR carries over to the case in which L1,
instead of L2, is performed in L. It asserts only the truth of SR does not depend
on a free choice that is made at a time that is later than the times of all the
possible events whose occurrences or non-occurrences under various conditions
specified in R determine, by definition, the truth of SR.
What does Unruh say about LOC2?
He says: “If it were true that one could deduce solely from the fact that a
measurement had been made at L that some relation on the right must hold,
then I would agree that this requirement [LOC2] would be reasonable.”
Well, one needs, of course, the other assumptions, including LOC1. But,
given those other assumptions, which I have specified, one can deduce SR
“solely” from the assumption that L2 is performed: one does not need to as-
sume that the outcome appearing to the observers stationed in L is c. So Unruh’s
statement appears to confirm that LOC2 is a valid expression of the condition
that there be no influence backward in time.
But then he immediately says: “However, if the truth of the relation on
the right hand side depended not only on which measurement had been made
[I would say “will be made”] on the left, but also on the actual value obtained
on the left, then no such locality condition would obtain.”
This muddies the waters, for it seems to contradict what he just said. How
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is this conflict resolved?
In logic one distinguishes between “proof”, “truth”, and “meaning”. Un-
ruh’s arguments blur these distinctions. He speaks of the dependence of the
truth of SR upon actual values obtained on the left. What is true is that the
proof of SR depends on the actual value c that appears on the left. But it does
not follow that the truth of SR depends on what happens later in region L.
The truth of SR depends, by definition, on the occurrence or non-occurrence of
possible events in the earlier region R, under various conditions freely choosen
in R. LOC2 is the assertion that the free choice made later by the experimenter
in L leaves undisturbed an existing pattern in those earlier possible events in R.
What about Unruh’s earlier claim that “this meaning of LOC1, is insuffi-
cient to derive his [Stapp’s] conclusion, since it demands that L2 had actually
been measured and had the given outcome. It ties the meaning of this local-
ity condition to the actuality of the measurement and its outcome. This does
not allow counterfactual replacement of L2, since the truth of this statement
is, under this interpretation, tied to the truth of the measurement of attribute
L2 actually having been carried out in L, and having obtained that specified
outcome.”
It is of course essential, in following a logical argument, to proceed step-by-
step in a logical progression that leads from the assumptions to the conclusions,
rather than collapsing the steps to a single unjustified leap. In my proof the
assumption LOC1 is used to get line 5. In that application of LOC1 the experi-
ment performed in region L is fixed to be the actually performed experiment L2.
And the premise of SR, together with a prediction of quantum theory, allows
one to conclude that the outcome actually observed by the observers in L is
the outcome c. So all the conditions for the applicability of LOC1 are satisfied.
LOC1 is not used thereafter.
The answer, therefore, to Unruh’s claim about the insufficiency of LOC1
is that LOC1 is used only under conditions where its use is justified, and in
particular only under the condition that L2 is performed in L.
Unruh advances several other arguments that I should also address. He
suggests that perhaps LOC1 means that “if one is somehow able to infer that
L2 has value c then it remains true that L2 has value c under replacement of R2
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with R1 even if the outcome of the measurement R2 was crucial in drawing the
inference that L2 has value c.” He says that: “This interpretation of LOC1 is.
I would argue, a form of realism, in that it claims that the value to be ascribed
to L2 is independent of the evidence used to determine that value.”
This argument confounds several separate steps in my argument. LOC1
asserts merely that if L2 and R2 are performed in L and R respectively, where
L is earlier than R in some frame, and if outcome c appears to the observers
stationed in L, then that same result c would appear to these observers in
L if everything were kept exactly the same except for the later-in-time free
choice by the experimenter in R, and the consequences of that change. In the
actual situation specified by the three conditions L2 and R2 and g a result
from quantum theory entails that the outcome c appears to the observers in
L. Given this fact, one can use LOC1 to deduce what “would happen” in L in
the hypothetical situation in which this factual situation is changed solely by a
change in the free choice in R and the consequences of that change. According
to LOC1 this change in R would not disturb the actual outcome that appears
to the observers stationed in the earlier region L: the observers in the earlier
region L would continue to observe outcome c.
As in most logical arguments it is important to follow the steps in the proof.
In this case the “evidence” for the fact that the actual result in L is c, lies in
the fact that the actual situation under consideration is one in which L2 and R2
are performed, and the outcome appearing to the observers in R is g, combined
with the knowledge provided by quantum theory that under these conditions
the outcome appearing to the observers in L is c.
Of course, one of the consequences of changing the free choice made in R
from R2 to R1 is that under these altered conditions the outcome appearing
to the observers in R would be different from what it actually is. But LOC1
asserts that what has already been observed by the observers stationed in the
earlier region L will not be changed by this change in the later free choice made
in R: the present actual evidence of one’s senses does not depend on what some
experimenter will freely choose to do tomorrow, as it might well do if that later
free choice could effect prior events.
Unruh considers my line 4, and says: “The claim is that this arises solely by
6
logic out of the substitution of (2) and (3) into (1). However, it is now clear that
the meanings ascribed to LOC1 and to the statements of the logical calculus are
crucial.”
It certainly is clear that meanings ascribed to LOC1 and the statements
of the logical calculus are crucial. I have spelled out here in prose what these
meanings are, and how they enter into my proof. Unruh proposes some other
meaning, which he formalizes in his Eq. 14.
Whatever that equation means, it definitely does not conform to the rules
of modal logic. Certainly, one cannot say, as Eq. 14 does, that if R1 is performed
instead of R2 then R2 is performed. And Unruh’s claim that the final inference,
namely that (L2 and c and R2 and f) implies (L2 and R1 and f) “is no longer
true” certainly makes his logic incompatible with modal logic, and with classical
logic as well.
Unruh goes on to restate his objections in various other ways, But I believe
I have already explained how my proof rationally evades all of the difficulties he
encountered.
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